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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the same week Apple released its iPhone 4S,1 California Governor Jerry 
Brown prevented the California Legislature from imposing limits on warrantless 
searches of smartphones and left it with the judicial system.2 On October 9, 2011, 
Brown vetoed Senate Bill (SB) 914, which would have prevented police officers 
from searching an arrestee’s smartphone without a search warrant.3 Brown 
reasoned that “[c]ourts are better suited to resolve the complex and case-specific 
issues relating to constitutional search-and-seizure protections.”4 The manner in 
which California’s courts have handled the issue suggests otherwise.5 
For example, in California v. Nottoli, a Santa Cruz Sheriff’s Deputy stopped 
Reid Nottoli for speeding early in the morning on December 6, 2009.6 The deputy 
said Nottoli was nervous and sweating, appeared wide-awake, and had glassy and 
bloodshot eyes that moved quickly.7 The deputy also noted the driver’s rapid 
heartbeat, breathing, and speech—indications that Nottoli was under the 
influence of a controlled substance.8 Even though Nottoli claimed he had 
consumed caffeinated energy drinks, evidence of which was dispersed 
throughout the car, the deputy believed Nottoli was intoxicated.9 The deputy 
radioed in the stop and then called the watch commander, who informed the 
deputy that Nottoli had been arrested for drug sales years ago.10 
After conducting a series of field sobriety tests, the deputy concluded Nottoli 
was under the influence of a stimulant controlled substance and placed him under 
arrest.11 During a subsequent search of Nottoli’s car, the deputy found drug 
paraphernalia, a gun, and a cell phone.12 The deputy searched the cell phone for 
 
1. Casey Newton, Apple’s iPhone 4S Generates Big 1st-Day Sales, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 15, 2011, 3:17 
PM), http://articles.sfgate.com/2011-10-15/business/30285202_1_unlimited-data-iphone-terry-stenzel (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). 
2. Nathan Olivarez-Giles, Jerry Brown Vetoes Bill Requiring Warrant to Search Cellphones, L.A. TIMES 
(Oct. 10, 2011), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2011/10/warrant-cellphone-tablet.html (on file with 
the McGeorge Law Review). 
3. David Kravets, Calif. Governor Allows Warrantless Cellphone Searches, WIRED MAG. (Oct. 10, 
2011, 11:09 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/10/warrantless-phone-searches/ (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
4. Orin Kerr, Governor Brown Vetoes Bill on Searching Cell Phones Incident to Arrest, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Oct. 10, 2011, 2:29 AM), http://volokh.com/2011/10/10/governor-brown-vetoes-bill-on-
searching-cell-phones-incident-to-arrest/ [hereinafter Kerr, Governor Brown Vetoes Bill] (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
5. See infra Part II.B (discussing the development and rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court). 
6. 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884, 891 (Ct. App. 2011). 
7. Id.  
8. Id. 
9. Id.  
10. Id.  
11. Id. at 892. 
12. Id. at 893. 
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additional evidence of drug use.13 What he found was a photograph of two men 
holding assault rifles, which are “difficult to obtain legally in California.”14 
Another officer also conducted a search of the photos, text messages, and e-mails 
on Nottoli’s cell phone, finding additional evidence of illegal weapons and 
marijuana cultivation.15 Subsequent tests revealed Nottoli was not under the 
influence of stimulants, and prosecutors did not charge Nottoli for driving under 
the influence.16 However, the original stop for speeding allowed the deputy to 
search Nottoli’s cell phone, which led to the discovery of evidence of other 
crimes—a search the Court of Appeal for the Sixth District in California upheld 
as valid under the search incident to lawful arrest doctrine (SILA).17 Based on 
evidence obtained from that cell phone search, prosecutors charged Nottoli with 
possession of marijuana for sale, cultivation of marijuana, possession of a deadly 
weapon, possession of a controlled substance, possession of an assault weapon, 
possession of a destructive device, and possession of a blowgun.18 
The Nottoli court’s interpretation of California v. Diaz, which upheld a 
warrantless search of a cell phone ninety-minutes after an arrest,19 expanded the 
scope of searches under SILA.20 Now, law enforcement officers are able to search 
through an arrestee’s cell phone for any evidence, even if the cell phone is not 
related to the crime for which the suspect is arrested.21 Courts have expanded the 
SILA doctrine to encompass cell phones by analogizing them to pagers,22 address 
books,23 and cigarette packs.24 In the process, courts have not recognized the 
greater invasion of privacy stemming from a SILA search of cell phones 
compared to “analogous” items.25 As more Americans upgrade from basic cell 
 
13. Id.  
14. Id.  
15. Id. at 894. 
16. Id. at 893–94. It should be noted that test results did show a presumptive positive for THC and 
opiates. Id. 
17. Id. at 907. 
18. Id. at 889. 
19. California v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 511 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, No. 10-1231, 2011 WL 4530138 
(U.S. Oct. 3, 2011) (denying a motion to suppress text messages retrieved from a cell phone as a search incident 
to a lawful arrest in a case involving the sale of ecstasy). 
20. Nottoli, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 907. 
21. Kravets, supra note 3; see also Nottoli, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 907 (finding “deputies had unqualified 
authority . . . to search the passenger compartment of the vehicle and any container found therein”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
22. United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996) (analogizing a cell phone to a pager). 
23. Luke M. Milligan, Analogy Breakers: A Reality Check on Emerging Technologies, 80 MISS. L.J. 
1319, 1319–20 (2011) (“Government lawyers regularly claim that cell phones should be treated like ‘address 
books’ because they share a functional role: aggregating contact information of friends and associates.”). 
24. Diaz, 244 P.3d at 505–06 (upholding a warrantless search after finding the arrestee’s cell phone was 
akin to the cigarette package in the defendant’s coat in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)—a case 
in which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a warrantless search under SILA). 
25. Milligan, supra note 23, at 1329 (“While the iPhone is (arguably) functionally analogous to the 
litigation bag (both are mobile containers which store documents), the doctrine’s application to iPhones 
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phones26 to smartphones,27 evolving technology continues to advance beyond past 
courts’ analogies.28 As cell phones become all-encompassing gadgets,29 the 
California Legislature should step in where the California courts have not.30 The 
California Legislature needs to enact a statute with enough concessions to satisfy 
law enforcement unions31 and enough teeth to remove smartphones from SILA, 
which has failed to protect the “wealth of private information” those devices now 
have the ability to contain.32 
This Comment argues that the California Legislature should limit SILA to 
exclude cell phones from these warrantless searches. It proposes a rule that 
narrows warrantless searches of smartphones to situations where the suspect, or 
his agents, may destroy or hide the evidence of the crime for which law 
enforcement arrested the suspect. The search must be limited to the relevant areas 
of the smartphone; and finally, law enforcement must treat a password-protected 
cell phone like locked luggage.33 
 
exponentially increases the amount of private information obtainable by the government without cause or a 
warrant.”). 
26. See Jessica Dolcourt, Best Basic Phones, CNET (Sept. 4, 2012, 7:30 AM), http://reviews. 
cnet.com/best-basic-phones/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review), for an examination of basic cell phones 
that include calling, texting, and picture features but do not access the Internet. 
27. Brian Dolan, Study: 42 Percent of U.S. Uses a Smartphone, MOBI HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 20, 2010), 
http://mobihealthnews.com/6178/study-42-percent-of-u-s-uses-a-smartphone/ (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (finding the percentage of U.S. consumers who owned a smartphone rose from fifteen percent in 
October 2006 to forty-two percent by the end of 2009); see also Liane Cassavoy, What Makes a Smartphone 
Smart?, http://cellphones.about.com/od/smartphonebasics/a/what_is_smart.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting smartphones’ abilities to use e-mail, connect to the Internet and 
data networks, edit documents, and use an operating system that runs applications differentiates them from 
traditional cell phones). 
28. Milligan, supra note 23, at 1330 (finding that past precedents, when applied to emerging 
technologies, eventually lose their usefulness with each subsequent comparison, leaving them “but faintly 
recognizable in any of its alleged progeny”). 
29. See Jared Newman, What Smartphones Will Be Like in 2012, PC WORLD (Nov. 10, 2011), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/243590/what_smartphones_will_be_like_in_2012.html (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (noting the latest smartphones are equipped with better processors, higher-resolution 
screens and cameras, and faster networks and will include the capability to wave the phone in front of a 
payment kiosk instead of using a credit card); see also iPhone 4S Technical Specifications, APPLE, 
http://www.apple.com/iphone/specs.html (last accessed Nov. 10, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review). 
30. See Kerr, Governor Brown Vetoes Bill, supra note 4 (“[L]egislatures have a major institutional 
advantage over courts in this setting. They can better assess facts, more easily amend the law to reflect the latest 
technology, are not stuck following precedents, can adopt more creative regulatory solutions, and can act 
without a case or controversy. For these reasons, legislatures are much better equipped than courts to strike the 
balance between security and privacy when technology is in flux.”). 
31. See Kravets, supra note 3 (speculating that Governor Jerry Brown’s veto was aimed at pleasing law 
enforcement unions that supported his campaign and opposed SB 914). 
32. Matthew E. Orso, Cellular Phones, Warrantless Searches, and the New Frontier of Fourth 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 183, 200–01 (2010). 
33. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 
565 (1982) (suppressing evidence police obtained after conducting a warrantless search of a double-locked 
footlocker). 
04_COOPER_VER_01_7-13-12_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2013 9:59 AM 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 44 
367 
Part II details the ebb and flow of SILA, beginning with its modern adoption 
in Chimel v. California as an exception34 to the general rule that warrantless 
searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.35 This Part traces 
how the United States Supreme Court expanded SILA from its original 
justifications of police officer safety and evidence preservation, how the Court 
has applied the exception to various objects, and how lower courts have 
expanded SILA to encompass cell phones.36 Part III examines the types of items 
to which courts have analogized cell phones while applying SILA, how 
developing smartphone technology outpaces courts’ reasoning, and how the 
judicial system has failed to protect the private information smartphones store. 
Part III also argues the legislature is better equipped than the judicial system to 
protect privacy rights in evolving technologies, and the ubiquitous use of 
smartphones necessitates a forward-looking rule.37 Finally, Part IV summarizes 
California Senator Mark Leno’s first attempt to protect cell phones from 
warrantless searches and explains why it failed to satisfy Governor Brown and 
the law enforcement unions that support the Governor. It proposes a modified 
rule that would still protect smartphone users’ private data from warrantless 
searches with enough concessions to satisfy the needs and concerns of law 
enforcement officials. 
II. FROM CHIMEL TO DIAZ: CHARTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SILA, BEGINNING 
WITH COINS AND ENDING WITH CELL PHONES 
Part A details the beginning of the modern SILA doctrine and the rationales 
behind it and then traces SILA’s subsequent development. Part B examines the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s attempt to narrow SILA. Part C lays out the limited impact 
of those attempts, while Part D outlines how courts have applied SILA to cell 
phones. 
A.  The Development and Expansion of SILA 
The U.S. Supreme Court adopted the modern version of SILA in Chimel v. 
California.38 In Chimel, the Court found it reasonable to allow officers to search 
an arrestee and the area within the arrestee’s reach for weapons and evidence 
 
34. 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (finding SILA was justified by a reasonable search for weapons and to 
prevent the arrestee from hiding or destroying evidence). 
35. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 
(1967)). 
36. See infra Part II.A–B (detailing the expansion of SILA). 
37. See infra Part III.A–B (explaining why current rules have not adequately protected cell phones from 
police search). 
38. 395 U.S. at 763. 
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without a warrant.39 The Court justified its interpretation of SILA with law 
enforcement safety and preservation of evidence.40 In Chimel, the police obtained 
an arrest warrant for the defendant following the burglary of a coin shop.41 When 
the defendant arrived at his house, police arrested him and then conducted a 
forty-five-minute search of his home—without a search warrant—going so far as 
to search drawers in the defendant’s bedroom.42 The officers seized a number of 
coins, medals, and tokens that the prosecution used at trial.43 The Court held that 
absent the constitutional justifications of officer safety or evidence preservation, 
a warrantless search, like the one in Chimel, resembled the general warrant 
searches the Fourth Amendment aimed to eradicate;44 therefore, this search could 
not be justified under SILA.45 
The Court’s initial conception of SILA remained consistent with the 
principle of “particular justification,” which requires officers to obtain a search 
warrant under the Fourth Amendment before searching a person or place, subject 
to narrowly tailored exceptions.46 The government must justify warrantless 
searches in each case, and the scope must be limited to the government’s 
particular need for the search.47 Therefore, when the government attempts to 
apply a warrant exception to a new set of facts, the exception must narrowly 
serve the original justifications for the exception.48 Chimel’s version of SILA 
addressed the needs of evidence preservation and officer safety.49 In theory, any 
 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 762–63. 
41. Id. at 753. 
42. Id. at 753–54. 
43. Id. 
44. A general warrant traditionally gave law enforcement officers “broad discretion or authority to 
search and seize unspecified places or persons. A general warrant lacks a sufficiently particularized description 
of the person or thing to be seized or the place to be searched. General warrants are unconstitutional because 
they do not meet the Fourth Amendment’s specificity requirements.” General Warrant Law & Legal Definition, 
USLEGAL.COM, http://definitions.uslegal.com/g/general-warrant/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
45. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 767–68 (citing United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1926)). 
Some other exceptions to the general rule requiring a warrant include the emergency doctrine, consent, and 
third-party exposure. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (concerning 
an exception for information exposed to a third party); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 4.1(b) (5th 
ed. 2012). The emergency doctrine allows a warrantless search where getting a warrant would result in losing 
the evidence. Id. A person also can lose her Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy by exposing information 
to third parties, thus eliminating the warrant requirement. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957. Closely related to the third-
party exception, a person also can consent to a search, thus waiving the warrant requirement. 2 LaFave, supra, § 
4.1(b).  
46. Catherine Hancock, State Court Activism and Searches Incident to Arrest, 68 VA. L. REV. 1085, 
1095–96 (1982). 
47. Id.  
48. Douglas M. Smith, Comment, Ohio v. Robinette: Per Se Unreasonable, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 897, 
900 (1998). 
49. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63. 
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subsequent application of SILA should be limited to those twin aims.50 However, 
as the next section shows, the Court has not tethered subsequent applications of 
SILA to those original government needs.51 
1.  Moving Away from Chimel’s Original Justifications 
Four years after Chimel, the Court expanded SILA to permit warrantless 
searches of closed containers on an arrestee’s person and expanded its rationale 
for permitting warrantless SILA searches by using a reasonableness standard.52 In 
United States v. Robinson, the Court held that an officer’s search of the cigarette 
pack the officer found in the arrestee’s jacket pocket, turning up fourteen 
capsules of heroin, passed constitutional muster.53 The Court created a bright-line 
rule, holding that a search of an arrestee’s person was “reasonable” and thus did 
not require the original justifications from Chimel.54 
United States v. Edwards55 relaxed the temporal requirement that a SILA 
search be contemporaneous with the arrest.56 The Edwards Court held that items 
immediately associated with an arrestee’s person can be searched “even though a 
substantial period of time has elapsed” between the arrest and search.57 Edwards 
allowed lower courts to uphold warrantless searches of arrestees’ cell phones 
 
50. Id. 
51. Justin M. Wolcott, Are Smartphones Like Footlockers or Crumpled Up Cigarette Packages? 
Applying the Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine to Smartphones in South Carolina Courts, 61 S.C. L. REV. 843, 
845–47 (2010). 
52. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235–37 (1973). 
53. Id. at 235. 
54. Id. 
The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to 
disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was the 
probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the 
person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable 
intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest 
requires no additional justification. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also Wolcott, supra note 51, at 846 (finding that Robinson “eroded Fourth 
Amendment protections” the Court created in Chimel). 
55. 415 U.S. 800, 808 (1974). 
56. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 753, 764 (1969) (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 
(1964)). 
The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the need to seize weapons 
and other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need 
to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime-things which might easily happen where the 
weapon or evidence is on the accused’s person or under his immediate control. But these 
justifications are absent where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest. 
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). 
57. Edwards, 415 U.S. at 807. “Immediate possession” means property within the arrestee’s immediate 
possession—essentially what a person carries with him or her when moving from one place to another. Id. at 
803–04. 
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well after their arrests, meaning neither the contemporaneous requirement nor the 
twin justifications of SILA were present during the subsequent searches.58 
The Court did limit the reach of SILA in United States v. Chadwick, holding 
that once officers have exclusive possession over luggage or other personal 
property not “immediately associated with [a] person,” the search is “no longer 
an incident of the arrest.”59 Chadwick involved a footlocker that law enforcement 
officials seized during an arrest and searched ninety-minutes later.60 The Court 
found the search was “remote in time or place from the arrest” and, therefore, 
invalid under SILA.61 But after Chadwick’s narrow approach to SILA, limited by 
Chimel’s twin justifications of evidence preservation and officer safety, the Court 
once again strayed from in subsequent decisions premised on a general 
reasonableness analysis of the search.62 
2.  The Court Finding SILA More Reasonable 
After Chadwick restricted Robinson,63 the Court wandered even further away 
from the principle of particular justification used in Chimel.64 New York v. 
Belton65 played a central role in that departure. Belton began with a traffic stop 
for speeding.66 The officer smelled burnt marijuana and spotted an envelope he 
believed contained more of the drug.67 The officer placed the vehicle’s four 
occupants under arrest and ordered them to stand separate from one another 
outside of the vehicle.68 The officer then searched the car and discovered cocaine 
in the pocket of a leather jacket.69 Despite the fact the suspects were under arrest, 
standing away from the vehicle, and could not have reached the jacket, the Court 
found that the passenger compartment of an automobile was within the area an 
arrestee could reach.70 Citing Robinson and striving to create an easy-to-apply 
rule, the Court sacrificed Chimel’s twin justifications for a reasonableness 
 
58. See infra Part II.D.1 (reviewing cases in which courts used SILA to uphold warrantless searches of 
cell phones). 
59. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977), abrogated by, California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 
565 (1991). 
60. Id. at 3–5. 
61. Id.  
62. See infra Part II.A.2 (detailing the Supreme Court’s finding SILA more reasonable). 
63. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15. 
64. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (holding the twin justifications for SILA are 
officer safety and evidence preservation). 
65. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
66. Id. at 455. 
67. Id. at 455–56. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 459–60. 
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analysis by allowing warrantless searches of an arrestee’s automobile and any 
containers found within.71 
Two decades later, in Thorton v. United States, the Court extended Belton to 
permit an officer to search a vehicle when an arrestee was a “recent occupant” of 
the vehicle.72 The Court validated a warrantless search of an automobile where 
the officer confronted and arrested the defendant after the defendant exited his 
car.73 While concurring in the judgment in Thornton, Justice Scalia noted that 
Belton could not be explained as a direct application of Chimel and involved a 
much broader interpretation of SILA.74 Justice Scalia advocated limiting Belton’s 
broad holding to searches where an officer reasonably believed “evidence 
relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”75 Despite Justice 
Scalia’s approach and Chimel’s justifications for SILA, with the broad holdings 
of Robinson, Belton, and Thornton, lower courts “have taken a broad approach 
and upheld searches of numerous small containers incident to arrest” and “not 
hesitated to apply the search incident to arrest doctrine in new situations 
unforeseen by the Supreme Court.”76 
B.  An Attempt to Return to the Twin Justifications of Chimel 
In Arizona v. Gant, the Court attempted to clarify the approach to SILA 
established by Chimel and Belton.77 There, an officer arrested the defendant for 
driving with a suspended license.78 While the arrestee sat in the back of a police 
car, the officer searched the arrestee’s car and located cocaine.79 The Court noted 
that lower courts’ and police academies’ broad reading of Belton allowed a 
warrantless search of an automobile regardless of the reason for the arrest and 
whether he had access to the vehicle.80 Justice Stevens’ majority opinion81 took a 
narrow view of Belton, however, and held that a warrantless search of a vehicle 
 
71. Id. at 459 (noting that a search under Robinson not only fit within a Fourth Amendment exception 
but was also a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment). 
72. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 622 (2004) (internal quotations omitted). 
73. Id. at 618, 623–24. 
74. Id. at 631–32 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
75. Id. at 632. 
76. Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27, 35–36 
(2008). 
77. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
78. Id. at 335. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 341–42, 344. 
81. Justice Scalia concurred, creating a five-Justice majority. However, Justice Scalia also advocated 
abandoning the Belton-Thornton line of cases and allowing a SILA search of the passenger compartment of a 
vehicle only where the officer had reason to believe evidence of the crime for which the suspect was arrested 
would be found in the automobile. Justice Scalia noted he could not command a majority to overrule Belton and 
Thornton, so he concurred with Justice Stevens’ rule, finding it the lesser of two evils, to at least narrow SILA’s 
application. Id. at 335. 
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incident to a lawful arrest was constitutional only when “an arrestee is within 
reaching distance of the vehicle or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains 
evidence of the offense of arrest.”82 The Court expressed concern with a rule that 
allowed officers to search any container in an automobile even when the 
arrestable offense was merely a traffic violation.83 The Gant Court held the search 
unreasonable, and explained that when an arrest involves a traffic violation, it is 
not reasonable for officers to believe that a vehicle contains evidence of that 
offense.84 
To counter the lower courts’ broad application of Belton, Gant seemingly 
reattached SILA to Chimel’s justifications of evidence preservation and officer 
safety,85 as opposed to the reasonableness analysis that seemed to permeate the 
Supreme Court’s expansion of SILA.86 And if Gant applies broadly, then the 
analogies courts have drawn between the cigarette package in Robinson and the 
footlocker in Chadwick to determine whether the search of the item is valid under 
SILA become irrelevant once the defendant is secured and the item (for our 
purposes, a cell phone) does not involve evidence relating to the arrest.87 
C.  Gant’s Limited Impact 
Even absent such an exigency, lower courts, at least in the context of cell 
phones, have cabined Gant’s holding to SILA searches of automobiles,88 meaning 
the analogies drawn between Robinson and Chadwick remain relevant in 
 
82. Id. at 346 (emphasis added). 
83. Id. at 344. 
84. Id.  
85. Orso, supra note 32, at 208–09 (arguing that Gant’s limited holding should apply in non-vehicle 
contexts, as well). 
86. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (finding that an arrest with probable cause 
is a reasonable under the Fourth Amendment; therefore, a SILA search “requires no additional justification”); 
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462 (1981) (holding the passenger compartment of a vehicle to be “within 
the arrestee’s immediate control” for the purposes of a SILA search even when the arrestee is no longer in the 
car); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 623–24 (2004) (extending a bright line rule that allows a SILA 
search of a vehicle if the arrestee was merely “[a] recent occupant” of the vehicle). 
87. Orso, supra note 32, at 208–09. 
88. California v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 507 n.9 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94 (U.S. 2011) 
(finding Gant was not relevant because it involved a search of an area within the immediate control of an 
arrestee, not a search of the arrestee’s person); Smallwood v. Florida, 61 So. 3d 448, 452–54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2011) (finding Gant, on which defendant relied for appeal, inapplicable to a search of appellant’s person, 
though the court noted it shared the same privacy concerns as Gant); United States v. Hill, No. CR 10-00261 
JSW, 2011 WL 90130, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011) (finding the rule in Robinson to apply to a warrantless 
search of arrestee’s iPhone, not Gant, because the phone was in the defendant’s pocket); Fawdry v. Florida, 70 
So. 3d 626, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that Gant was not relevant because the search took place in 
a home, not a vehicle, and the defendant was carrying the cell phone on his person); see also United States v. 
Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 713 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that other circuits were divided over whether Gant was limited 
to vehicular searches but declining to answer the question, holding a search of arrestee’s cell phone was valid 
under the good-faith exception of the exclusionary rule instead). 
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practice. However, Belton allows officers to consider anything, including 
containers, inside the passenger compartment of a vehicle to be within the scope 
of the rule in Robinson, regardless of whether the arrestee can actually reach the 
item.89 Since the majority of SILA searches of cell phones occur in the context of 
a vehicle stop, a broad reading of Belton,90 coupled with a narrow reading of 
Gant, renders the distinction between Chadwick and Robinson irrelevant in an 
automobile context.91 
California v. Nottoli92 illustrates this point. After the defendant was 
handcuffed and placed in the police car, the officer found the arrestee’s cell 
phone in the car’s cup holder.93 The California appellate court stated Gant left the 
scope of a Belton search unchanged94 and found officers had authority under the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s SILA precedents to search the defendant’s car and any 
containers therein.95 The California court found that Gant still empowered 
officers with the broad search power of Belton, if the officers reasonably believed 
evidence might be found in the vehicle (not necessarily the cell phone).96 
In Notolli, the defendant was pulled over for speeding; he never was charged 
with driving under the influence; the energy drinks in the vehicle explained the 
defendant’s level of alertness; he was not carrying the cell phone on his person; 
and he was in the back of a police car when police seized and searched his 
phone.97 Even then, the California appellate court still found these circumstances 
within the limits of Robinson and Gant.98 Thus, the court allowed police to search 
the cell phone of a person arrested for driving on an expired license without a 
warrant99 even though, as Justice Stevens noted in Gant, police cannot “expect to 
find evidence in the passenger compartment” of such an offense.100 
While some commentators thought Gant would require courts to offer more 
protection to cell phones from warrantless searches,101 the trend among courts has 
been the opposite.102 The California Supreme Court continued the departure from 
 
89. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. 
90. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 347, 351 (2009). 
91. California v. Nottoli, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884, 898–900 (Ct. App. 2011). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 892–93. 
94. Id. at 904. 
95. Id. at 904–05. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 890–93. 
98. Id. at 904–05. 
99. Id. at 892. 
100. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 344 (2009). In Nottoli, police later admitted the arrestee “was not 
sufficiently impaired to require involvement of” the California Highway Patrol and “was not arrested for 
driving under the influence.” Nottoli, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 893. 
101. Orso, supra note 32, at 208–09. 
102. See infra Part II.D.1 (reviewing cases in which courts used SILA to uphold warrantless searches of 
cell phones). 
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Chimel’s original justifications in Diaz.103 The court in Diaz upheld a warrantless 
search of the defendant’s cell phone ninety-minutes after his arrest for 
participating in an ecstasy buy.104 After initially questioning the defendant, 
officers searched his cell phone for text messages related to the buy and then 
confronted the defendant with those texts to elicit a confession.105 The Notolli 
court followed suit by allowing a search of a cell phone when there was no 
possibility the phone contained evidence related to the arrestee’s expired 
license.106 Thus, both the Diaz and Notolli courts demonstrated that Gant’s impact 
on California courts is minimal, and lower courts in other states have similar 
narrowed Gant’s limitation on SILA searches of cell phones.107 
D.  SILA Applied to Cell Phones 
The first section details the cases, and the reasoning behind them, that found 
warrantless searches of cell phones valid, while the second section surveys courts 
that did not uphold warrantless searches of cell phones. 
1.  Warrantless Searches Found Valid 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not applied SILA to a case involving a 
cell phone, the supreme courts of California108 and Ohio109 and two federal 
circuits110 have weighed in on the matter. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit addressed the topic first in United States v. Finley, a case involving a 
warrantless search of the defendant’s cell phone after a controlled 
methamphetamine buy.111 The suspect participated in a sale of methamphetamine 
to a police source at a truck stop and then was pulled over after leaving the 
scene.112 Police arrested the suspect and seized his cell phone.113 DEA agents later 
searched the cell phone while questioning the defendant at a separate location 
and found texts and call records related to the drug sale.114 Citing Robinson115 and 
 
103. California v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94 (2011). 
104. Id. at 502–03. 
105. Id. 
106. California v. Nottoli, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884, 890–93 (Ct. App. 2011). 
107. See infra Part II.D.1 (reviewing cases in which courts used SILA to uphold warrantless searches of 
cell phones). 
108. Diaz, 244 P.3d at 501. 
109. Ohio v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 102 (2010). 
110. United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2016 (2009); United 
States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007). 
111. 477 F.3d at 253. 
112. Id. at 253–54. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 260 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973)) (upholding a warrantless 
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United States v. Ortiz, which upheld a warrantless search of a pager,116 the Fifth 
Circuit upheld the search of the cell phone under SILA.117 The approach 
(analogizing to a pager) and result (upholding a warrantless search) of the Fifth 
Circuit is one that most lower courts have followed in subsequent cases involving 
warrantless searches of cell phones.118 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Murphy, 
upheld the warrantless searches of three defendants’ cell phones following a 
traffic stop that turned up cocaine, counterfeit currency, fakes IDs, and nearly 
$15,000.119 The law enforcement officers did not search the seized cell phones 
until they returned to a DEA office, at which point they discovered text messages 
identifying one of the arrestees as a drug supplier.120 In upholding the search, the 
Fourth Circuit declined to delineate between simple cell phones and those with 
large storage capacity and functionality.121 
Diaz came next, also a case involving the alleged sale of drugs.122 The 
arrestee drove a co-defendant to buy ecstasy.123 Officers did not search the 
arrestee’s cell phone until they transported the defendant back to the sheriff’s 
station—ninety-minutes after the initial arrest.124 The arrestee admitted his role in 
the sale when shown his incriminating text messages.125 In upholding the search, 
the Supreme Court of California utilized a bright-line rule for SILA searches of 
cell phones immediately associated with the arrestee’s person,126 like the cigarette 
pack in Robinson.127 The California Supreme Court found cell phone searches 
valid under the Fourth Amendment even if they do not fit within the original 
justifications of the SILA exception.128 The Court rejected arguments that the 
scope of a SILA search should be tailored to the nature of the object searched or 
that a search of a cell phone should be distinguished from a search of a cell 
 
search of a cigarette package). 
116. 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996). 
117. Finley, 477 F.3d at 260. 
118. Orso, supra note 32, at 203. 
119. United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 407–09 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2016 
(2009). 
120. Id. at 409. 
121. Id. at 411–12. 
122. California v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 502 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94 (2011). 
123. Id. at 502. 
124. Id. at 502–03. 
125. Id. at 503. 
126. Id. at 509. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. (noting the Robinson Court adopted the “straightforward, easily applied, and predictably 
enforced rule that a full [warrantless] search of the person is constitutionally permissible, and [rejected] the 
suggestion that there must be litigated in each case the issue of whether or not there was present one of the 
reasons supporting the authority for a search of the person incident to a lawful arrest”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)). 
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phone’s contents.129 Citing Robinson, the Court noted “a ‘lawful custodial arrest 
justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have’ in 
property immediately associated with his or her person at the time of arrest.”130 
Finally, in response to the defendant’s and dissenting judge’s argument that 
developing cell phone technology necessitated a new rule, the majority stated, 
“[i]f, as the dissent asserts, the wisdom of the high court’s decision ‘must be 
newly evaluated’ in light of modern technology . . . then that reevaluation must 
be undertaken by the high court itself.”131 The U.S. Supreme Court denied 
certiorari in Murphy and Diaz.132 The lower courts that followed suit in upholding 
cell phone searches pursuant to SILA—especially in drug cases—are 
numerous.133 
2.  Warrantless Searches Found Invalid 
Not every court agrees with the bright-line approach to SILA and cell 
phones, and two notable decisions have attempted to narrow the reach SILA has 
in the area of cell phones.134 In United States v. Park, police surveillance of an 
indoor marijuana cultivation operation led to the arrest of the defendants and 
warrantless searches of their cell phones at the police station.135 The Park court 
found that this type of warrantless search did not fit within the original SILA 
justifications.136 Thus, the court declined to follow the Fifth Circuit’s adoption in 
Finley of a bright-line rule regarding cell phones associated with an arrestee’s 
person.137 Park held that the vast amount of information cell phones contain 
necessitates treating them like a container within an arrestee’s immediate control, 
like in Chadwick; therefore, once police have exclusive control over a cell phone, 
officers need a warrant to search that phone.138 
Ohio v. Smith also involved an arrest for drug dealing and a search of the 
defendant’s cell phone at the police station.139 Like the Park court, the Supreme 
Court of Ohio found that the purposes of the officer’s search did not fit within the 
traditional justifications of SILA.140 However, these cases are outliers, and the 
 
129. Id. at 508. 
130. Id. (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235). 
131. Id. at 511 (internal quotations omitted). 
132. Diaz v. California, 132 S. Ct. 94 (2011); Murphy v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2016 (2009). 
133. See Orso, supra note 32, at 203 (citing numerous cases to support the assertion that a majority of 
lower courts have upheld SILA searches of arrestee’s cell phones). 
134. Infra notes 135–40. 
135. No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007). 
136. Id. at *8–9. 
137. Id.  
138. Id. at *9. 
139. 920 N.E.2d 949, 950–51 (Ohio 2009). 
140. Id. at 955; see also United States v. Wall, No. 08-60016-CR, 2008 WL 5381412 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 
2008), aff’d, 343 F. App’x 564 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding a text message on a cell phone is akin to a sealed letter, 
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majority of lower courts have had little trouble analogizing traditional SILA 
searches to the modern world of cell phones.141 
E.  How Gant’s Holding Applies to Smartphones with Remote-Wipe Programs 
New exigencies associated with emerging technologies could further justify 
warrantless searches of an arrestee’s smartphone142—even under Gant’s 
narrowing of SILA.143 Users can now equip their smartphones with remote-wipe 
programs that allow someone to send a signal to the phone from a computer, 
prompting the device to erase all of its data.144 Because one of the original 
rationales of SILA is the preservation of evidence,145 the threat of remotely 
erasing a phone still would be present when police take a person into custody. 
Indeed, at least one court has upheld a search of a cell phone based on officers’ 
fears that a phone’s contents might be erased.146 However, police can disable this 
function by turning off the phone, placing it in a container that blocks the signal, 
or removing the battery, thus negating the exigency.147 Therefore, police should 
still have to obtain a warrant to search a smartphone in most situations under a 
broad reading of Gant,148 but that has not always been the case in practice.149 The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently accepted this exigency 
argument in United States v. Flores-Lopez in allowing a warrantless search of a 
cell phone to retrieve its number.150 
 
requiring a warrant); United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (finding a 
warrantless search of a cell phone to be invalid because the defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended 
license and the search was for drug-related evidence). 
141. Orso, supra note 32, at 203. 
142. Infra notes 134–40 (examining how officers could still search cell phones under Gant’s holding). 
143. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 344, 351–52 (2009). 
144. Jamie Lendino, How to Remotely Disable Your Lost or Stolen Phone, PCMAG (Apr. 12, 2012), 
http://www.pcmag.com/ article2/0,2817,2352755,00.asp#fbid=ehwTo0NI8Qw (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review); see also Ben Grubb, Remote Wiping Thwarts Secret Service, ZDNET (May 18, 2010, 4:43 PM), 
http://www.zdnet.com.au/remote-wiping-thwarts-secret-service-339303239.htm (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review) (detailing how accomplices of arrestees can remotely erase the arrestee’s seized cell phone). 
145. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969). 
146. United States v. Young, Nos. 05CR63-01-02, 2006 WL 1302667, at *13 (N.D. W.V. May 9, 2006) 
(finding that the cell phone could be set to erase text messages in a case involving heroin trafficking, thus 
creating a sufficient exigency to support a warrantless search of the phone); see also United States v. Zamora, 
No. 1:05 CR 250 WSD, 2006 WL 418390, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 21, 2006) (upholding a warrantless search in a 
case involving the manufacture of methamphetamine because the phone might be enabled to erase the incoming 
call log periodically and officers could not determine if the function was turned on and would kick in before 
police could obtain a warrant). 
147. Grubb, supra note 144. 
148. Orso, supra note 32, at 208 (arguing that if lower courts apply Gant generally, a warrantless search 
of an arrestee’s cell phone would be invalid once officers secured the arrestee out of reach of her cell phone). 
149. United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F. 3d 803, 809–10 (7th Cir. 2012). 
150. Id. (“We said it was conceivable, not probable, that a confederate of the defendant would have 
wiped the data from the defendant’s cell phone before the government could obtain a search warrant; and it 
could be argued that the risk of destruction of evidence was indeed so slight as to be outweighed by the invasion 
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III. HOW COURTS HAVE FAILED TO PROTECT PRIVACY  
INTERESTS IN CELL PHONES 
This section analyzes the progression courts have followed to apply SILA to 
cell phones. It then details how the reasoning has broken down in the smartphone 
context and why legislatures, not courts, are better suited to adapt search-and-
seizure rules to emerging technologies. 
A.  The Analogies that Bring SILA and Cell Phones Together 
Analogizing is a necessity for legal reasoning, especially as courts attempt to 
fashion precedent to new technologies that old rules did not originally 
conceptualize.151 While necessary, the process is far from fail proof as courts have 
struggled to grasp the purpose and development of new technologies.152 Problems 
arise when a court finds that an object traditionally covered by a rule has 
something in common with a new technology, and the court then creates another 
functional category under that rule for the new technology.153 As courts continue 
to create additional categories based on finding one or two traits in common, they 
eventually “deviate over time (and often subconsciously) from the intended arc 
of precedent” through the use of what one commentator calls “mono-logical 
reasoning.”154 
In a cell phone context, one can trace a line from Robinson’s cigarette 
package to modern defendants’ cell phones to illustrate the point.155 After the 
Robinson Court found the warrantless search of a cigarette pack valid under 
SILA,156 subsequent courts upheld searches of various other items located in 
arrestees’ pockets like wallets,157 address books,158 diaries,159 day planners,160 
 
of privacy from the search.”). 
151. Milligan, supra note 23, at 1323. 
152. See City of Richmond v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 174 U.S. 761, 773 (1899) (citing a number of 
courts that found telephone communications to be the same as telegraph communications and thus regulated by 
the same laws); see also Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 244–45 (1915) (finding 
movies to be mere entertaining pictures made for profit, not deserving of First Amendment protection); 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (finding that because wire taps did not involve a physical 
trespass, they did not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
153. Milligan, supra note 23, at 1329–30. 
154. Id. (noting that over time, this type of reasoning creates an “‘operator’ effect: where the essence of 
past decisions is but faintly recognizable in any of its alleged progeny”). 
155. See infra notes 156–63 (detailing how courts have applied SILA to different scenarios). 
156. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973). 
157. United States v. Molinaro, 877 F.2d 1341, 1346–47 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that Robinson stood for 
the proposition that a SILA search encompasses personal property found in an arrestee’s pockets and citing 
numerous cases that reached the same conclusion). 
158. United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776, 778 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding the photocopying of the 
defendant’s address book to be permissible in the absence of a warrant). 
159. United States v. Frankenberry, 387 F.2d 337, 339 (2d Cir. 1967). 
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purses,161 and pagers.162 All of those items were personal property associated with 
a person and could contain similar types of private information—a parallel that 
allowed the courts to make short, logical jumps from one item to the next. When 
cell phone cases made their way into courts, judges had ample precedent to bring 
cell phones into the SILA fold.163 
However, this type of reasoning breaks down when courts fail to consider the 
relevant differences between objects.164 As one commentator noted: 
(1) Litigation bags have certain functions X, Y, and Z; (2) iPhones differ 
functionally from litigation bags (for instance, they offer functions A and 
B) but share functions X, Y, and Z; (3) The law permits warrantless 
searches of litigation bags found within an arrestee’s grab area; (4) 
Because iPhones share functions X, Y, and Z with litigation bags, the 
law should permit warrantless searches of iPhones found within an 
arrestee’s grab area.165 
This type of thinking focuses on similarities while failing to consider the 
greater amount of information cell phones store and the number of people who 
use them.166 As Justice Sotomayor discussed in her concurring opinion in United 
States v. Jones, the traditional rule that a person loses a Fourth Amendment 
expectation of privacy in data exposed to third parties is “ill suited to the digital 
age.”167 Justice Sotomayor opined that the amount of information users convey to 
their cell phone companies and Internet providers should cause the Court to step 
back and reconsider its disclosure rule in the future.168 In a similar vein, one 
commentator proposes that courts need to recognize that their analogies 
breakdown in situations where the extractable information from the new 
technology far exceeds that contained in the object creating the precedent.169 
When the analogy breaks down, courts should undertake a “fresh analysis” of the 
emerging technology.170 
 
160. United States v. Vaneenwyk, 206 F. Supp. 2d 423, 425 (W.D.N.Y. 2002). 
161. United States v. Gonzalez-Perez, 426 F.2d 1283, 1287 (5th Cir. 1970). 
162. United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Chan, 830 F. 
Supp. 531, 536 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that while a person has an expectation of privacy in a pager, an 
arrestee loses that expectation during a valid exercise of police officers’ SILA power). 
163. See United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 104, 110 (D. Mass. 2009) (finding no way to 
distinguish a cell phone from a wallet or address book); see also United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th 
Cir. 2007) (comparing cell phones to valid, warrantless searches of pagers). 
164. Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning Commentary, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 746 (1993). 
165. Milligan, supra note 23, at 1329. 
166. Id. at 1329–30. 
167. 132 S. Ct. 945, 958 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
168. Id. 
169. Milligan, supra note 23, at 1335. 
170. Id. 
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One can see this type of approach under the Fourth Amendment in the 
context of thermal imaging scans, addressed in Kyllo v. United States.171 Prior to 
Kyllo, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed surveillance of a home so long as the 
portion of the house police observed was in plain view and officers were not 
trespassing.172 The Court then upheld enhanced aerial photographs of an industrial 
complex173 and standard photographs of a defendant’s backyard,174 noting that 
“[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited police from augmenting the 
sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science 
and technology afforded them . . . .”175 Lower courts had also upheld warrantless 
surveillance with the aid of a flashlight176 or binoculars.177 
Logically, the facts of Kyllo—observation of the outside of a home, using a 
thermal imaging device, where the officer was standing in a public place178—
would seem a natural extension of permissible observation under Fourth 
Amendment precedent from the use of cameras, flashlights, and binoculars to 
thermal imaging scanners.179 Indeed, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth,180 
Seventh,181 Eighth,182 Ninth,183 and Eleventh184 Circuits found a thermal scan of a 
home did not constitute a search. 
However, Justice Scalia noted that the technological advances diminished the 
Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections and, while the scan in Kyllo was crude 
and did not compromise the defendant’s privacy in this specific case, the Court 
needed a forward-looking rule to cover “more sophisticated systems” that were 
sure to follow.185 
 
171. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
172. California v. Ciraolo, 467 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (“The Fourth Amendment protection of the home 
has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on 
public thoroughfares. Nor does the mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his 
activities preclude an officer’s observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which 
renders the activities clearly visible.”). 
173. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986). 
174. Ciraolo, 467 U.S. at 214–15. 
175. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983). 
176. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (holding that looking into a barn with the aid of a 
flashlight was not a search); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (finding that using a flashlight to look into a 
car was not a search). 
177. United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1978); Fullbright v. United States, 392 
F.2d 432, 434 (10th Cir. 1968). 
178. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29–30 (2001). 
179. Id. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing the search in Kyllo was valid because it only involved 
“nothing more than off-the-wall surveillance by law enforcement officers to gather information exposed to the 
general public from the outside of petitioner’s home”). 
180. United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995). 
181. United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995). 
182. United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994). 
183. United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
184. United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1995). 
185. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33–34, 36, 40. 
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Justice Scalia could have found that thermal imaging scans and aerial 
photography each involved using technology to take a picture of the outside of a 
building that is within public view (similarities of X and Y in the previous 
example),186 ignored the differences in what each type of surveillance actually 
revealed (differences A and B),187 and added thermal imaging as a category of 
surveillance that is not considered a search under the Fourth Amendment. 
Instead, Justice Scalia acknowledged that thermal imaging scans are much more 
intrusive because they actually reveal what is happening inside the home—
information that could not be attained from simply looking at a house from the 
street.188 Because thermal imaging invaded the homeowner’s privacy in a way 
that aerial surveillance did not, Justice Scalia undertook a “fresh analysis”189 of an 
emerging technology, creating a new rule to govern thermal imaging.190 
Recently, in United States v. Jones, Justice Sotomayor also acknowledged 
that traditional rules finding no expectation of privacy in data voluntarily 
disclosed to third parties also should be re-examined because people now expose 
a large amount of information to third parties during the course of day-to-day 
tasks.191 Because our electronic devises transmit far more information about us 
than they did in the past (Internet browsing history, cell phones that show our 
location and movement, medications purchased online, et cetera), Justice 
Sotomayor suggested the old rules developed in an era of rotary phones no longer 
comport with the modern age.192 While Jones dealt with GPS tracking devices, 
Sotomayor’s logic applies to smartphones as well, furthering the argument that 
old rules often do not adequately cover rapidly developing technologies.193 
B.  Where Courts Have Come Up Short  
Kyllo’s approach is useful when analyzing the issue of SILA searches and 
smartphones. While the majority of SILA cell phone cases involved older phones 
with rudimentary functions like call logs, contact lists, and text messages,194 
 
186. Milligan, supra note 23, at 1329. 
187. Id. 
188. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38. 
189. Milligan, supra note 23, at 1335. 
190. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (holding that when the government “uses a device that is not in general public 
use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the 
surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant”). 
191. 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence provided 
the deciding vote for the five-justice majority, joining Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, along with Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Kennedy.). 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. See California v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 502 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94 (2011) (involving 
text messages); Ohio v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 950 (Ohio 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 102 (2010) (involving 
a search of call records and phone numbers); United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 104, 106–07 (D. Mass. 
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smartphones have become all-encompassing gadgets.195 Today, a smartphone 
contains text messages, e-mail, Internet, photos, video, calendars, social 
networking, music, movies, GPS navigation, barcode readers, applications for 
virtually anything, and, of course, a telephone feature.196 Smartphones also now 
function as credit cards that users can swipe in front of a kiosk to pay a bill.197 
They can turn off the lights in one’s house,198 unlock one’s car remotely,199 or 
even monitor one’s blood pressure.200 The only limit to smartphones’ capabilities 
seems to be the imagination of their manufacturers. 
Kyllo and the previous discussion of analogical reasoning201 provide an 
analytical framework for the ever-expanding capabilities of smartphones.202 
Smartphones are like wallets in that they can contain documents203 like receipts, 
 
2009) (involving a search of the call records and caller ID); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 
2007) (involving a search of call records and text messages); United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 
WL 1521573, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007) (looking through a contact list); Hawkins v. Georgia, 704 S.E.2d 
886 (Ga. App. 2010) (involving a search of text messages). 
195. See generally Newman, supra note 29 (noting the newest smart phones will be faster, with better 
screens and cameras and will include the capability to wave the phone in front of a payment kiosk instead of 
using a credit card); see also APPLE, supra note 29. 
196. Amanda Gornot, What Are the Functions of a Smart Phone?, EHOW, http://www.ehow. 
com/info_8068722_ functions-smartphone.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review); How to Choose the Best Smart Phone Navigation App, CONSUMER REPORTS (Dec. 21, 2011, 3:30 
PM), http://news.consumerreports.org/cars/2011/12/how-to-choose-the-best-smart-phone-navigation-app.html 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
197. Jared Newman, Beyond Google Wallet: A Look at the Competition, PC WORLD (Sept. 19, 2011, 
2:27 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/240261/beyond_google_wallet_a_look_at_the_competition.html (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (looking at the competition Google Wallet faces in the market as Visa, 
Apple, and Isis develop their own smart phone payment programs). 
198. Throw Out Your Remotes, BLACKBERRY, http://www.blackberry.com/newsletters/connection/ 
personal/i509/remotes.shtml (last visited Dec. 29, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
199. Remotely Unlock and Start Your Car – Coming Soon to a Smartphone Near You, INDEPENDENT 
(LONDON) (July 23, 2010), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/motoring/remotely-unlock-and-start-your-
car--coming-soon-to-a-smartphone-near-you-2033987.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
200. Troy Wolverton, Smart Phone Functions Seep into All Sectors, PHYSORG (Jan. 16, 2011), 
http://www.physorg.com/news/2011-01-smart-functions-seep-sectors.html (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review). 
201. See supra Part III.A (explaining how monological reasoning allowed courts to bring emerging 
technologies under the umbrella of SILA). 
202. See Chris Morris, 5 Cool Features of the Next Wave of Smart Phones, YAHOO! PLUGGED IN (Oct. 
20, 2011, 8:00 PM), http://games.yahoo.com/blogs/plugged-in/5-cool-features-next-wave-smart-phones-
000041688.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing smart phones with flexible screens and 
augmented reality features that allow people to move with the phone to correspond to moving in a video game 
being used on the phone); see also Ginny Miles, Quad-Core Phones: What to Expect in 2012, PC WORLD (Dec. 
11, 2011, 5:30 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/246011/quadcore_phones_what_to_expect_in_2012.html 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the upcoming advances in the 2012 batch of smart 
phones). 
203. Matt Skaggs, Smartphones That Allow You to Work Excel Documents, SALON, http://techtips. 
salon.com/smartphones-allow-work-excel-documents-3493.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2011) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (detailing which types of smart phones run Microsoft Office, which includes Excel 
documents). 
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pictures,204 and, now, credit cards.205 Smartphones are like address books in that 
they contain contact information.206 Smartphones are like pagers in that they 
transmit electronic messages and phone numbers.207 But, while sufficient 
similarities exist to monologically compare smartphones to categories of items 
previously encompassed by SILA, the amount of private data contained in a 
smartphone—like the details of the home revealed by a thermal scan in Kyllo208—
greatly exceeds those other items.209 Therefore, courts should analyze warrantless 
searches of cell phones in general—and smartphones in particular—differently.210 
Unfortunately, many courts have not protected privacy interests in new 
technology,211 of which Nottoli212 is the latest chapter. 
C.  Judicial Entrenchment 
Some commentators argue that courts are best situated to protect privacy 
interests in new technology, with cases like Kyllo standing as examples of how 
courts can use the Fourth Amendment to craft technology-specific rules.213 These 
commentators argue that if drafting rules for new technologies is left to the 
legislature, those rules could reflect the will of the majority, rather than the 
constitutional values the Framers adopted to protect privacy.214 This perspective 
places its faith in judicial activism to apply these constitutional values to 
 
204. EHOW, supra note 196. 
205. Justine Rivero, No Plastic Needed: Consumers and the Future of Mobile Payments, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/justine-rivero/mobile-payment-technology_b_ 
988133.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
206. Milligan, supra note 23, at 1320; see also Gershowitz, supra note 76, at 40 (noting that courts have 
had little trouble analogizing cell phones to address books or envelopes). 
207. Milligan, supra note 23, at 1324–26; see also United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 
2007). 
208. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001). 
209. Milligan, supra note 23, at 1329; see also Gershowitz, supra note 76, at 40–42 (arguing that valid 
warrantless searches of iPhones raise concerns because iPhones store vast amounts of data compared even to 
traditional cell phones in addition to information accessible on smartphones through the Internet that is stored 
remotely). 
210. Milligan, supra note 23, at 1335. 
211. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case 
for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 807 (2004) [hereinafter Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New 
Technologies] (“[C]ourts rarely accept claims to Fourth Amendment protection in new technologies that do not 
involve interference with property rights, and have rejected broad claims to privacy in developing technologies 
with surprising consistency. The result is a critical gap between privacy rules the modern Fourth Amendment 
provides and privacy rules needed to effectively regulate government use of developing technologies.”). 
212. California v. Nottoli, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884, 891, 907 (Ct. App. 2011). 
213. See Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies, supra note 211, at 857 (attributing this 
view to those with a broad interpretation of the Fourth Amendment). 
214. Id. at 858 (“Because the Fourth Amendment reflects a clear commitment of the Framers to protect 
privacy, judges should identify the values of privacy in new technologies and translate them in to new Fourth 
Amendment rules.”). 
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developing technologies.215 However, in practice the courts have been far more 
deferential than this ideal requires.216 When the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted 
a new rule like Kyllo, lower courts have applied it narrowly and usually limit its 
scope to protecting the home.217 Kyllo is not viewed “as a symbolic endorsement 
of broad privacy rights in new technologies.”218 Courts are not deviating from a 
“relatively humble and deferential . . . attitude” in the area of the Fourth 
Amendment.219 Rather than utilizing a forward-looking approach when adapting 
rules to protect privacy rights inherent in the Fourth Amendment, courts seem 
content to analogize emerging technologies to cigarette packages and the like, 
allowing our privacy interest to shrink with each subsequent update.220 
D.  Why the Task of Protecting Our Smartphones Best Lies with the Legislature 
The Fourth Amendment attempts to strike a balance between legitimate law 
enforcement goals and the privacy and autonomy of individuals.221 While courts 
have drafted rules that served both of those Fourth Amendment goals when 
technologies are stable, the legislature is better suited for developing rules to 
govern areas of rapid change,222 something Justice Alito acknowledged in United 
States v. Jones.223 One commentator illustrated this point using the example of 
traffic stops.224 The issues posed by a traffic stop have remained constant for 
decades—a passenger’s privacy interests in her automobile, the officer’s safety 
concerns regarding weapons in the vehicle, and policy concerns about a driver’s 
ability “to speed away” and “later dispose of the evidence.”225 Courts are able to 
consider the effects of new rules with the benefit of familiar circumstances and a 
long period of time for analysis.226 Through this process, courts developed stable 
rules that allow officers to stop vehicles for any minor offense and search the 
 
215. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 222–23 (1999). 
216. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies, supra note 211, at 835. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. at 837. 
219. Id. at 838. 
220. See supra Part III.B (explaining how emerging capabilities of smartphones necessitates treating 
them differently than other objects analyzed under the Fourth Amendment). 
221. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies, supra note 211, at 861. 
222. Id. at 861–62. 
223. 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (finding that “[i]n circumstances involving 
dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative. A legislative body is 
well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety 
in a comprehensive way”) (citations omitted). Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined Justice Alito in 
concurring in the judgment in a case involving GPS tracking devices. Id. at 958. 
224. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies, supra note 211, at 862. 
225. Id. at 863. 
226. Id. at 863–64. 
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vehicle and pat down the driver if the officer has reasonable suspicion the driver 
or passenger has a weapon.227 
However, judges have difficulties when attempting to draft rules for a 
shifting landscape.228 The recent SILA cases involving cell phones illustrate the 
point.229 In Diaz, the court addressed the issue of a warrantless search of the text 
message folder of the defendant’s cell phone.230 Although the technology was 
available in 1993,231 the court did not address text messages and SILA until more 
than a decade and a half later.232 In the meantime, cell phones and the interests 
and concerns surrounding them changed greatly.233 
In Diaz, the court dismissed the defendant’s argument that cell phones should 
be treated differently than cigarette packs because of their storage capacity.234 The 
court noted the record lacked information on the storage capacity of the phone in 
question and there was no reason to exempt all cell phones from warrantless 
searches, “including those with limited storage capacities.”235 But this 
retrospective reasoning renders these judicially created rules obsolete as soon as 
they are handed down.236 
The California Supreme Court’s stance might have made sense when police 
searched the defendant’s phone in 2007.237 After all, in 2008, smartphones only 
made up ten percent of the U.S. cell phone market.238 But recent statistics show a 
vastly different landscape from when the officer thumbed through Gregory 
Diaz’s text messages five years ago.239 In 2011, the number of smartphone users 
in the United States jumped by 34 million to 95.8 million users240 and now 
 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at 858. 
229. See California v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 513–14 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, No. 10-1231, 2011 WL 
4530138 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2011) (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (arguing the majority’s opinion, which deals with text 
messages, also applies to smartphones that allow a person to carry more personal data in their pocket than ever 
before). 
230. Id. at 503–04. 
231. Shawn McClain, History of Texting on Mobile Phones, EHOW.COM, http://www.ehow.com/about_ 
6507906_history-texting-mobile-phones.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review). 
232. Diaz, 244 P.3d at 501. 
233. See supra Part III.D (explaining why the legislature is better suited to create rules for emerging 
technologies). 
234. Diaz, 244 P.3d at 508. 
235. Id. 
236. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies, supra note 211, at 861–62. 
237. Diaz, 244 P.3d at 502. 
238. Roger Entner, Smartphones to Overtake Feature Phones in U.S. by 2011, NIELSEN WIRE (Mar. 26, 
2010), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/consumer/smartphones-to-overtake-feature-phones-in-u-s-by-2011/ 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
239. Diaz, 244 P.3d at 502. 
240. Phil Goldstein, CTIA: U.S. Smartphone Users Now 95.8 Million, FIERCE WIRELESS (Oct. 11, 
2011), http://www.fiercewireless.com/ctialive/story/ctia-us-smartphone-users-now-total-958-million/2011-10-
11 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
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comprise forty-two percent of all mobile phone users in this county.241 Among the 
twenty-four-to-thirty-eight-year-old demograpic, fifty-eight percent of mobile 
users have a smartphone.242 What is more telling is how people are using all of 
those smartphones. Eighty-seven percent of smartphone users access the Internet 
from their phones, while twenty-five percent of users rely primarily on their 
phones to access the Internet.243 The ubiquity of smartphones is also changing 
behavior beyond mere browsing.244 For example, twenty-eight percent of 
smartphone owners used their phones to scan product barcodes in 2010 to 
compare prices or purchase items with their devices.245 Those numbers mean text 
messaging is the tip of the privacy iceberg among what will soon be a majority of 
smartphone users.246 Unlike a traffic stop—where the concerns and interests have 
remained steady for decades247—smartphones and their capabilities are ever 
evolving.248 In 2007, a user’s privacy concerns might have been limited to text 
messages, phone contacts, call histories, and photos. In 2013, those concerns 
encompass users’ Internet browsing history, e-mails, purchases, bank history, 
videos, past locations, friends, social media commentary . . . the list goes on.249 
Four years from now, who knows?250 
When technology develops rapidly, judges struggle to keep up. As one 
commentator stated: 
Courts lack the institutional capacity to easily grasp the privacy 
implications of new technologies they encounter. Judges cannot readily 
understand how the technologies may develop, cannot easily appreciate 
context, and often cannot even recognize whether the facts of the case 
 
241. comScore Releases the “2012 Mobile Future in Focus” Report, COMSCORE (Feb. 23, 2012), 
http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2012/2/comScore_Releases_the_2012_Mobile_Future
_in_Focus_Report (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
242. Ryan Kim, 1/4 of Smartphone Users Rely on Their Device for Internet Access, GIGAOM (July 11, 
2011), http://gigaom.com/2011/07/11/14-of-smartphone-users-rely-on-their-device-for-internet-access/ (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review) (citing a recent study by the Pew Internet & American Life Project). 
243. Id. 
244. See infra notes 245–46 (detailing the new ways in which owners use their smartphones). 
245. Compete Smartphone Intelligence Survey Shows Mobile Barcode Scanning Now Mainstream in 
Retail, MARKETWIRE (Jan. 6, 2011, 10:57 ET), http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/compete-smartphone-
intelligence-survey-shows-mobile-barcode-scanning-now-mainstream-1376718.htm (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review). 
246. See Keith Wagstaff, Nielsen: Majority of Mobile Subscribers Now Smartphone Owners, TIME (May 
7, 2012), http://techland.time.com/2012/05/07/nielsen-majority-of-mobile-subscribers-now-smartphone-owners/ 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining, as of 2012, more than fifty percent of cellular customers 
use smartphones). 
247. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies, supra note 211, at 862. 
248. Newman, supra note 29. 
249. Id.; Cassavoy, supra note 27. 
250. Abhijit Bangera, IBM: Mind Controlled Computers and Smartphones by 2017, GEEK TECH (Dec. 
20, 2011), http://geektech.in/archives/6810 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (speculating that in 2017, 
users might be able to control their smartphones with their minds). 
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before them raise privacy implications that happen to be typical or 
atypical. Judicially created rules also lack necessary flexibility; they 
cannot change quickly and cannot test various regulatory approaches. As 
a result, judicially created rules regulating government investigations 
tend to become quickly outdated or uncertain as technology changes. The 
context of legislative rule-creation offers significantly better prospects 
for the generation of balanced, nuanced, and effective investigative rules 
involving new technologies.251 
Balancing the Fourth Amendment issues of privacy and law enforcement 
regarding smartphone development implicates new privacy interests that 
continually impact the changing dynamic between officer and suspect.252 These 
types of rapidly evolving policy considerations are best left to the legislature, 
“not by lawyers skilled in reading Supreme Court opinions.”253 
IV. WHY THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE FAILED IN THE PAST AND HOW IT CAN 
SUCCEED IN THE FUTURE 
This Part details a previous legislative attempt to protect smartphones from 
warrantless searches. It then explains why that previous attempt failed and how 
to create a legislative coalition to ensure future success in this area.  
A.  The Life and Death of SB 914 
Forty-six days after the California Supreme Court announced its decision in 
Diaz,254 State Senator Mark Leno responded with SB 914.255 SB 914 noted that 
more Californians use “portable electronic devises” every day that store vast 
amounts of “personal and private information.”256 Because smartphones have 
Internet access, that personal data accessible through user’s devices can be stored 
on computers across the globe.257 The bill forbid police from conducting 
warrantless searches of a suspect’s “portable electronic devices,” defined as “any 
portable device that is capable of creating, receiving, accessing, or storing 
electronic data or communications.”258 Senator Leno noted that absent an 
immediate threat to police or public safety, police officers could only access the 
 
251. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies, supra note 211, at 858–59. 
252. Id. at 864–65. 
253. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional Caution, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 361, 363 (1996). 
254. 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011) cert. denied, No. 10-1231, 2011 WL 4530138 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2011). 
255. SB 914, AROUND THE CAPITOL, http://www.aroundthecapitol.com/billtrack/text.html?bvid 
=20110SB91498AMD (last visited July 3, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
256. S.B. 914, 2011 Cal. Leg., 2011–2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011) (vetoed). 
257. Id. 
258. Id. 
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contents of a seized cell phone by obtaining a warrant.259 Senator Leno further 
stated: 
The simple fact that technology allows us to store all this information in 
our portable phones instead of our homes doesn’t give government the 
right to view them at will. 260 Such an intrusive search is a violation of 
your privacy, and could allow authorities to incriminate you and others, 
even if it is not related to your arrest. 261 
SB 914 received support from the American Civil Liberties Union, the 
California Newspaper Publishers Association, the California Broadcasters 
Association, the California Public Defenders Association, the California 
Attorneys for Criminal Justice, the First Amendment Coalition, the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation,262 and the endorsement of some commentators, as well.263 SB 
914 cruised through the California Assembly (70–0) and Senate (28–9)264 and 
landed on Governor Brown’s desk in September 2011.265 
The only organization opposed to SB 914 in the final bill analysis might be 
the reason Diaz remains good law in California.266 The Peace Officers Research 
Association of California (PORAC) opposed the bill, arguing that “[r]estricting 
the authority of a peace officer to search an arrestee unduly restricts their ability 
to apply the law, fight crime, discover evidence valuable to an investigation and 
protect the citizens of California.”267 While Governor Brown said courts were 
 
259. Press Release, Sen. Mark Leno, You and Your Smart Phone Have a Right to Privacy (July 12, 
2011), available at http://senweb03.senate.ca.gov/focus/outreach/sd03/sd03-ealert-20110712.asp (on file with 
the McGeorge Law Review). 
260. Id. 
261. Id. 
262. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 914, at 10 (Cal. 2011), 
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0901-0950/sb_914_cfa_20110621_140130_asm 
_comm.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
263. See Peter Scheer, Urging Gov. Brown to Sign SB 914, CAL. COAST NEWS (Sept. 22, 2011), 
http://calcoastnews.com/2011/09/urging-gov-brown-to-sign-sb-914/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(urging Gov. Brown to sign SB 914, while also acknowledging the sway law enforcement interests who 
opposed the bill had with the governor); Editorial, Gov. Brown Should Sign Cellphone Search Law, L.A. TIMES 
(Oct. 8, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/08/opinion/la-ed-cellphone-20111008 (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (arguing the bill would not hamper law enforcement or threaten officers’ safety); Ryan 
Singel, Gov. Brown: Sign Bill Outlawing Warrantless Smartphone Searches, WIRED MAG. (Sept. 22, 2011), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/09/smartphone-warrant/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(predicting a veto by the governor even while advocating Brown sign off on SB 914). 
264. Complete Bill History of SB 914, http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0901-0950/sb_914 
_bill_20120301_history (last visited July 4, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
265. Id. 
266. See infra notes 271–77 and accompanying text (detailing PORAC’s significant impact on 
California politics). 
267. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 914, at 9 (Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). 
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better suited to handle constitutional search-and-seizure issues,268 commentators 
speculated PORAC and other law enforcement unions influenced the governor’s 
decision to veto SB 914.269 Subsequently, the California Legislature did not 
attempt to override of Governor Brown’s veto.270 
The law enforcement unions in general, and PORAC in particular, have 
supported the governor in the past.271 PORAC recently gave $38,900 to Brown’s 
campaign, while seven police unions donated at least $12,900 each to Brown, for 
a total of $160,000 in campaign donations.272 PORAC boasts 64,000 members273 
and proclaims on its website,  
[n]o other organization can claim the legislative victories that PORAC 
has achieved. PORAC has the clout to tie up and/or kill legislative issues 
that are detrimental to peace officers. Through its active involvement and 
logical presentation of the facts, PORAC is rated as one of the most 
effective lobbying groups in California.274  
 
268. Olivarez-Giles, supra note 2. 
269. See Kravets, supra note 3 (asserting Gov. Brown’s veto solidified his standing with PORAC); see 
also Bob Egelko, Leno May Introduce Cell Phone Bill Next Year, S.F. CHRON. (OCT. 12, 2011), 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/10/11/BA551LGCD2.DTL (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review) (speculating that Senator Leno would have to satisfy “critical police groups as well as the 
governor” if he hoped to avoid a future veto on SB 914’s successors); Steven Greenhut, Brown Shows His 
Union Label, ORANGE CNTY. REGISTER (Oct. 15, 2011), http://www.ocregister.com/opinion/brown-322053-
union-bill.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (arguing that Governor Brown “puts the interest of 
some of the most controversial unions . . . ahead of the rights of citizens”); Peter Scheer, Brown Caves to 
Police, Vetoes Bill to Restrict Searches of Cell Phones, CAL COAST NEWS (Oct. 12, 2011), 
http://calcoastnews.com/2011/10/brown-caves-to-police-vetoes-bill-to-restrict-searches-of-cellphones/ (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review) (“The most likely explanation for the veto is that Brown caved to the pressure 
of law enforcement special interest groups. Their knee-jerk opposition to SB 914 was strong enough to 
overcome the judgment of large bipartisan majorities in both the Senate and the Assembly. This outcome, 
overriding the public will, raises the question whether police wield too much political power in California.”). 
270. To override a veto, the California Legislature needs a two-thirds vote in each house within sixty 
days of the veto. A Guide for Accessing California Legislative Information on the Internet, LEG. COUNS. STATE 
CAL. (Jan. 2009), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/guide.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). However, the 
legislature has not overridden a governor’s veto since 1979, and Senator Leno acknowledged, in reference to a 
separate bill, that the legislature loses power by not exercising its veto-override authority. Republicans Fail in 
Rare Attempt to Override Governor’s Veto, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2012), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/ 
california-politics/2012/01/jerry-brown-republican-veto-override-fails.html (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review). Indeed, the week after Governor Brown vetoed SB 914, Senator Leno was discussing reproposing the 
bill in one year, not overriding the veto. Egelko, supra note 269. Because of the unwillingness or inability of the 
California Legislature to override a governor’s veto, this Comment will proceed under the assumption that the 
only path for a bill protecting cell phones from warrantless searches would be to avoid a veto. 
271. See infra notes 272–75 (examining PORAC’s financial contributions to political candidates in 
California). 
272. Kravets, supra note 3. 
273. PEACE OFFICERS RESEARCH ASS’N OF CAL., MEMBER SERVICES 5, available at http://porac.org/, 
under the Membership Services tab (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
274. Legislation, PEACE OFFICERS RESEARCH ASS’N OF CAL., http://porac.org/political-action/ 
legislation/ (last visited July 3, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
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A review of PORAC’s recent efforts shows that assertion to be accurate. From 
2003 to 2010, PORAC invested $1.36 million in proposition campaigns and 
donated another $1.36 million to political candidates.275 Ten of the thirteen 
propositions PORAC supported ended in the result the organization sought, and 
seventy-one percent of its candidate donations supported winners.276 The Center 
on Juvenile and Criminal Justice concluded that PORAC is “a powerful lobbying 
organization in California” that has used its spending power to “gain favor with 
state candidates.”277 With specific regard to SB 914’s potential successors, one 
reporter projected that Senator Leno will need to satisfy PORAC and its law 
enforcement union brethren if the senator hopes to avoid another veto.278 
B.  How to Win over the Unions and Still Protect Privacy 
In considering whether to re-introduce SB 914 in the next legislative session, 
Senator Mark Leno acknowledged his decision may depend on whether he could 
satisfy unions like PORAC.279 With that goal in mind, the legislature should pass 
a statute that allows warrantless searches of cell phones only in situations where 
officers have a reasonable suspicion the cell phone contains evidence of the 
crime for which the suspect is being arrested and the evidence could be destroyed 
if police do not search the phone immediately. 
I propose a statute with much the same language as SB 914.280 However, SB 
914 would have eliminated SILA altogether as a means for an officer to 
warrantlessly search a cell phone,281 which drew PORAC’s aforementioned 
opposition.282 I propose amending section (a) of SB 914 to read: 
 
275. SELENA TEJI, PROMOTING THE “GET TOUGH” CRIME CONTROL AGENDA: THE PEACE OFFICERS 
RESEARCH ASSOCIATION OF CALIFORNIA (PORAC), CENTER ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1–3 (Nov. 
2011), available at http://www.cjcj.org/post/public/policy/porac/s/contribution/california/s/prison/crisis (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). 
276. Id. at 3–4. 
277. Id. at 8. 
278. Egelko, supra note 269. 
279. Id. 
280. SB 914 Bill Text, OFFICIAL CAL. LEGISLATIVE INFO., http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/ 
sb_0901-0950/sb_914_bill_20110902_enrolled.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review). SB 914 proposed: 
(a)  The information contained in a portable electronic device shall not be subject to search by a 
law enforcement officer incident to a lawful custodial arrest except pursuant to a warrant 
issued by a duly authorized magistrate using the procedures established by this chapter.  
(b)  As used in this section, “portable electronic device” means any portable device that is capable 
of creating, receiving, accessing, or storing electronic data or communications.  
(c)  Except as provided in subdivision (a), nothing in this section curtails law enforcement reliance 
on established exceptions to the warrant requirement.  
Id. 
281. Id. 
282. See supra Part IV.A (detailing PORAC’s opposition to SB 914).  
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(a) The information contained in a portable electronic device shall not be 
subject to search by a law enforcement officer incident to a lawful 
custodial arrest, except: 
i. Pursuant to a warrant issued by a duly authorized magistrate using 
the procedures established by this chapter, OR 
ii. Pursuant to the search incident to lawful arrest doctrine, if the 
arresting officer has reasonable suspicion the portable electronic 
device contains evidence of the crime for which the suspect is 
being arrested and the evidence could be destroyed if the officer 
does not search the phone immediately. This exception is limited 
to applications on the portable electronic device where an officer 
reasonably believes evidence of the crime for which the suspect 
was arrested exists. 
This would return SILA searches of cell phones to the evidence preservation 
justification of Chimel,283 while still recognizing the legitimate situations police 
face in which the warrant requirement may hinder a police investigation.284 
Limiting the search to applications on the phone where an officer reasonably 
believes the evidence exists prevents general warrant-style searches through a 
smartphone’s contents.285 This rule will prevent police from fishing through a 
suspect’s phone and should prevent any kind of search in traffic stops for moving 
violations, driving under the influence, driving with a suspended license, and the 
like, since cell phones would not reasonably contain evidence of those offenses.286 
The rule also still grants police enough flexibility to search cell phones for 
evidence of a specific crime, and preserve that evidence, when officers have 
reasonable suspicion the phone contains the evidence in question and an 
exigency warrants an immediate search. It simultaneously addresses the evidence 
preservation concerns of PORAC,287 while acknowledging the breadth of private 
information a smartphone can contain.288 PORAC has compromised to support 
 
283. See supra Part II.A. Note that PORAC did not cite officer safety as a reason for opposing SB 914, 
just its effect on officers’ ability to “fight crime” and “discover evidence.” SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, 
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 914, at 10 (Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
284. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 914, at 9 (Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). 
285. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761–63 (1969) (noting the Fourth Amendment was adopted to 
prevent general warrant searches which placed almost no restrictions on government intrusion). 
286. See generally Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 353 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding an illegal 
warrantless search of an automobile when the arrestee was apprehended for driving without a license because 
the object of the search was not evidence of the crime for which the officer arrested the suspect). 
287. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 914, at 10 (Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). 
288. See supra Part III.B. 
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legislation it initially opposed when concessions are made for officers289 and for 
politicians caving to public pressure when a PORAC-sponsored stance proved 
untenable under the limelight of media scrutiny.290 
This proposed bill puts politicians in a spot where they would have to choose 
between supporting legislation that addressed PORAC’s stated objectives and 
continuing to oppose a bill that prevented general searches through users’ 
phones.291 Thus, in a case like Diaz, where the officer has reason to believe a 
seized cell phone contains text messages related to an arrest for selling drugs292 
and that officer had reason to believe the evidence could be destroyed, he would 
have the right to search the text message folder of the phone. In a case like 
Notolli,293 the officer would need to reasonably believe the suspect was drunk, the 
phone contained evidence of that intoxication, and the evidence could be lost if 
the officer had to obtain a warrant before the officer could search the phone (a 
search limited to the applications the officer believed contained the evidence). 
Simply arresting someone for driving with a suspended license would no longer 
give the officer carte blanche authority to search the arrestee’s phone.294 
V. CONCLUSION 
Courts have strayed from the original justifications of SILA and extended its 
application to more situations and items.295 Consequently, cell phones have come 
within the scope of SILA, and courts have been content to analogize them to 
items like cigarette packs rather than acknowledging cell phones are inherently 
different and deserve fresh analysis and a new rule.296 Where courts have failed, 
legislatures can succeed by adopting more nuanced rules and finding the proper 
balance between evolving technologies and important policy issues.297 In 
California, the legislature’s rule would have to satisfy the law enforcement 
 
289. George Skelton, The State Taking Some License with Language Might Save Gun Bill, L.A. TIMES, 
Aug. 27, 2001, at 6 (detailing PORAC’s support of a handgun permit bill that the organization opposed until 
legislators carved out exceptions in the bill that exempted officers who had already received equivalent training 
from taking the tests necessary to receive a handgun license). 
290. John Diaz, Hiding Behind the Shield, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 13, 2008, at G4 (noting politicians backing 
away from a bill that would hide officer information, including salaries, from public when faced with the reality 
existing law already covered the stated rationale of protecting undercover officers). 
291. C.f. id. (mirroring the situation politicians faced in support of AB 1855 in 2008). 
292. California v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 502–03 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, No. 10-1231, 2011 WL 
4530138 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2011). It should be noted that in Diaz no such exigency was present to give the officer 
reason to believe the text messages could be lost if the phone was not searched immediately. See id. 
293. California v. Nottoli, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884, 891 (Ct. App. 2011). 
294. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 353 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
295. See supra Part II (detailing the history of the jurisprudence extending SILA to cell phones). 
296. See supra Part II.D, Part III (discussing the current application of SILA to cell phones, regardless 
of the technological advances). 
297. See supra Part III.D (analyzing why the legislature is an effective way to protect the increasing 
privacy concerns of smartphones). 
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unions.298 What Governor Brown’s veto of SB 914 demonstrated is the legislature 
needs a rule that takes into account the concerns of organizations like PORAC.299 
This Comment proposes a rule that attempts to strike a balance by allowing 
warrantless searches of cell phones where the officers reasonably believe 
evidence of the crime for which the suspect was arrested will be contained in 
specific applications on the phone and the evidence will be lost if the officer does 
not immediately search the phone. The rule prevents officers from generally 
rummaging through cell phones to find any evidence of illegality, while still 
taking into consideration law enforcement investigative needs. The rule strikes a 
pragmatic balance between our expanding privacy concerns in an electronic age 
and law enforcement’s need to fight crime committed with those devices. 
 
 
298. See supra Part IV (providing the history of California’s legislative initiatives and the reason for 
their failures). 
299. Id. 
